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POLITICAL ISLAM IN MOROCCO 
SAMIR AMGHAR* 
early twenty years ago, to talk about political Islam in the Maghreb was to talk 
exclusively about its Algerian and Tunisian variants. At the time, it seemed unlikely 
that Islamism could emerge in Morocco and Moroccan observers and political figures 
alike were firmly convinced that the King’s political function (‘amir al mouminoun) protected 
the country from this ideology. That all changed at the beginning of the 1990s, when Islamism 
burst upon the Moroccan political scene. Despite concerns among European Union (EU) and 
Moroccan political figures, the development of Islamism has upset neither the country’s 
political balance nor the monarchy’s relations with Europe. This article seeks to understand how 
the internal ideological evolution of Moroccan Islam and the international context have made 
collaboration with Europe possible. It points out that Moroccan Islamists have shown a desire to 
increase cooperation with Europe, which they argue has not been reciprocated by the EU. 
The Evolution of Moroccan Islamism 
The Islamist movement in Morocco is far from homogenous.
1 Pluralistic by nature, Moroccan 
Islamism can be divided between two groups: the Justice and Development Party (Hizbo 
alaadalati wa atanmia, or PJD in its French acronym) under the direction of Saad Eddine 
Othmani, and Justice and Charity (al ‘Adl wal ‘Ihsan, JC), led by Sheik Abdessalam Yassine. 
In political terms and by virtue of its clandestine organisation, JC must be considered as the 
most important Islamist group. After a long history of tension between Yassine and Hassan II, 
stretching back to the 1970s, in 1988 the former established JC as a new organisation. In 1989, 
the incarcerated Yassine was freed from prison but members of his group were often arrested by 
the police. In January 1990, the association was officially outlawed. Upon the death of Hassan 
II, the new King Mohammed VI, changed strategy with regards to the movement and ended 
surveillance of Yassine. Since then, the movement has consistently demanded legalisation. 
In contrast, the PJD was formed from the fusion of a large number of small moderate Islamist 
organisations and monarchist insiders. Under the name of the Constitutional and Democratic 
Popular Movement (MPDC) this coalition competed in the 1997 legislative elections and 
entered Parliament for the first time after winning nine seats. In 1998, the party changed its 
name to become the Justice and Development Party. During the 2002 legislative elections, the 
PJD won 42 out of 295 seats, becoming one of the country’s main political forces. In 2004, 
Saad Eddine Othmani became the party’s secretary general. 
The PJD represents what might be described as ‘legitimised Islam’ or ‘state Islam’. In contrast 
with JC, it does not call into question the Moroccan kingdom’s political foundations. The party 
is pro-monarchist and does not endorse a revolutionary rhetoric of social change aimed at 
creating an Islamic state. On the contrary, it holds that state and society are not to be Islamicised 
because Morocco is already a Muslim country. It nevertheless insists on the principle of 
defending Moroccan society’s Islamic identity through legislative and institutional means when 
that identity is threatened. This involves a basic discourse of probity founded on respect for 
religious morality. From this point of view, the PJD has acted as a party-pressure group, 
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mobilising when needed all those within Moroccan society and the Moroccan administration 
who believe that the country’s Islamic identity is under threat. The PJD frequently condemns all 
proposed measures that would diminish the Muslim character of the state or the monarchy. The 
PJD’s religious discourse is close to that of the Waqfs Ministry (Ministry of Religious Affairs). 
Its detractors hold that it is manipulated by the monarchy as a bulwark against Islamic terrorism 
and non-official Islam more generally. The party has recently moved from critical support for 
the government to ‘constructive opposition’. This strategy allows it to both satisfy the party’s 
radical wing and pursue a policy of integration by means of political alliances. PJD criticisms of 
the government thus aim at gaining a certain popularity among the impoverished segment of the 
middle class, but without jeopardising more complex state alliance strategies on issues related to 
the defence of the country’s Islamic identity.
2 
In Parliament, PJD politicians now downplay religious themes and questions related to religious 
faith in favour of more political and secular matters. Moreover, they have adapted their political 
programme to the government’s public policies. It is difficult to precisely define the party’s 
political programme, which is characterised by inconsistency. Political pragmatism takes 
precedence over the clear definition of a recognisable ideology. The party’s political programme 
does not result from a homogenous way of thinking founded upon a fundamental theory 
developed by party leaders and intellectuals. Instead, the PJD’s programme is pragmatically 
constructed. These positions are sufficiently flexible to allow the party to endorse various 
government policies when necessary, and at the same time to criticise other positions of the 
government in order to appear as a platform for protest among militants.  
Organised as a political party, the PJD’s structure is nevertheless tied to a religious association, 
the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), which brings together 200 different groups. 
Although the party denies any organic relationship with this federation of religious associations, 
most PJD leaders are members of the MUR, holding various functions, depending upon the 
structure to which they belong. There is a division of labour between the MUR and the PJD: 
while the latter adheres to its pro-monarchist position, the MUR is more critical of the 
authorities and remains in contact with its base through religious and pastoral associational 
work. 
JC differs significantly from the PJD in terms of its ideology and its relationship with the 
monarchy. JC is highly critical of the monarchy and resolutely affirms the necessity of adopting 
a republican form of government. The movement does not hesitate openly to criticise 
Mohammed VI, calling for the construction of an Islamic republic that would respect 
democratic values and the rights of man. According to Nadia Yassine, the daughter of JC’s 
founder, ‘the monarchy is not made for Morocco’, ‘the Constitution deserves to be thrown upon 
the garbage heap of history’, and ‘all signs indicate that the monarchy will soon collapse’.
3 The 
organisation places itself outside of the system. Organised around the figure of the charismatic 
leader, the movement’s open conflict with the regime makes it the most virulent opposition to 
the monarchy in Morocco. While the PJD develops its non-confrontational relations with the 
King, the JC is in permanent conflict with the authorities and has on several occasions been 
subjected to repression. ‘We are the object of very strong police pressure in Morocco because 
we are critical of the system’,
4 states Nadia Yassine. Yet, while it openly opposes the monarchy, 
the JC nevertheless condemns political assassination and armed violence. Instead of indirect 
action, the JC prefers recourse to legalistic and pacifist action (demonstrations, petitions, and so 
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forth); its members have disowned the violent tactics deployed in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
association is tolerated but closely watched. It does have its own press. Invoking Sufism, the 
organisation proclaims a desire to Islamicise society non-violently through education. It is 
active in the charitable domain and owes much of its influence to its social activism. While the 
PJD separated its political and religious wings, religious activities and political activism coexist 
within the JC. 
For the PJD, support for democracy in part results from a desire to appear respectable in a 
context in which Islamism was considered an unreliable partner. For the JC, locked in conflict 
with the monarchy, supporting democracy represents a means of showing opposition to the 
regime. While both organisations have thus come to support democracy for tactical reasons, this 
positioning has arguably pushed party members to internalise a positive belief in democracy as 
the most legitimate form of political system. It is for this reason that JC and PJD members make 
such great efforts to define the contours of ‘an Islamic democracy’ and Islam’s intrinsically 
democratic dimension. Nadia Yassine regularly asserts Islam’s democratic character, claiming 
that the Prophet himself governed according to the principle of popular sovereignty. 
Moroccan Islamists and European Democracy  
More than merely rhetorically supporting the democratic norms that prevail in Europe, 
Moroccan Islamists have increasingly become participants within the European political space. 
At the end of the 1990s, Sheik Yassine’s Justice and Charity movement began viewing Europe 
as a land of exile and political expression. Realising that the spread of their ideology was 
limited and even blocked by the kingdom, JC decided to ‘export’ their movement beyond 
national frontiers. This export took place through the creation of an association whose 
subsidiaries are found both in Europe and the United States: the Muslim Participation and 
Spirituality (MPS) association. The creation of this movement was the result of the activism of 
political refugees who had fled political repression in their countries of origin, as well as 
political engagement on the part of students undertaking advanced degree programmes in the 
early 1990s. Expressing itself from outside the country on the Moroccan situation and hoping 
thereby to put pressure on the monarchy, the MPS seeks to profit from its presence in Europe in 
order to win legal status for the Moroccan JC, as well as guarantees concerning democracy and 
human rights. For the Islamists of the Justice and Charity party, having a foothold in Europe is 
part of a strategy to ensure that their country is not their only site of political engagement.  
By becoming a force of opposition in Europe to the Moroccan regime, the JC-MPS movement 
appeared  mutadis mutandis to be an agent for democratisation. The French and Belgian 
branches of the MPS regularly organised demonstrations denouncing the political situation in 
Morocco. The MPS’ chief of public relations in France, Abderrahman Makhlouf, affirms that 
‘no one talks about the catastrophic political context in Morocco.  With the means at our 
disposal, we have sought to alert French public opinion to the very poor situation in which the 
movement of Sheik Yassine finds itself in Morocco.’
5 It is in the same spirit that Nadia Yassine 
regularly visits France in order to denounce the political situation in her country and the 
repression which her movement is subject to. Thus, on 17 June 2006, the ‘New Europe-
Morocco Friendship’, an association close to Sheik Yassine’s Islamist movement, denounced 
the political repression of the movement on the part of the Moroccan government by organising 
a conference in Brussels hosted by the Sheik’s daughter, on the theme ‘Human Rights Flouted 
in Morocco’.  
                                                      
5 Interview with Abderrahman Makhlouf, Paris, 8 June 2006. 4 | SAMIR AMGHAR 
 
With repression of the Justice and Charity continuing a month later, Nadia Yassine launched a 
tour around Europe to denounce police oppression. At one of her appearances in France, she 
declared, ‘The conditions for political and democratic participation in Morocco are not present. 
How are people to vote and choose their leaders when an important segment of the population is 
illiterate? In these circumstances, talk of free elections is a joke. There’s a lock on the political 
game and elections are nothing more than a farce’. Despite a structure that is presented as 
autonomous, the MPS continues to be directed by Sheik Yassine’s daughter and to give voice to 
his party’s ideology, particularly via conferences concerning Islamic banking and modernity 
(democracy, secularism, women’s rights). Muslim, French-language internet sites such as 
Saphirnews
6 and Oumma.com, which are read by many young Muslims in Europe, also 
advocate the party’s positions. In a statement posted on Oumma.com, Nadia Yassine asserts: 
Contrary to other countries like Spain, Belgium and even the United States, France hardly 
respects the human rights of which it is so proud, especially where we are concerned. In 
practice, human rights only go one way and are chosen and applied according to the 
standards of Western political correctness. France is so close to the Moroccan monarchy 
that it has forgotten its strongest and most essential principles! I believe that France will 
pull itself together and prove to the world that all oppressed people can count on it now and 
forever. 
Moroccan movements in Europe have integrated into the available political framework, by 
means of councils such as the CFCM, the presence of imams in local mosques, or into the 
Islamic associative landscape. Justice and Charity thus decided to pursue its policy of criticising 
the Moroccan regime within the MPS, not by addressing the question of the monarchy’s 
illegitimacy, but rather in the area of human rights and public liberties. In 2006, PSM supporters 
living in Belgium and France created the Alliance for Freedom and Dignity (AFD), an 
association responsible for promoting and defending democracy and human rights in Muslim 
countries (and particularly Morocco) by organising various demonstrations and conferences.  
While Sheik Yassine’s movement uses Europe as a political platform (something it cannot do so 
freely in Morocco), for the PJD maintaining a presence in Europe is more a question of electoral 
strategy. Nearly three million Moroccans (or nearly 10% of the total Moroccan population) live 
abroad, most of them in Europe (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy). The PJD 
regards these immigrants and their dual-nationality children as a not insignificant electoral 
reservoir, capable of being mobilised in the course of campaigns. In April 2006 the PJD 
organised a ‘European electoral campaign’ aimed at their compatriots living in Europe in the 
hope of winning their votes for the 2007 elections. As a militant of the Islamist party living in 
France suggested: ‘With legislative elections approaching, it is normal that we should organise 
official meetings and informal gatherings in order to inform Moroccan immigrants about our 
social project and our programme. The aim is to found an electoral base in Europe’.
7 
Given the electoral strength of Moroccan nationals living abroad, the PJD has even recently 
exerted pressure to ensure better representation in elections. Thus, together with other political 
groups, in 2006 it signed a communiqué condemning ‘government backsliding with regards to 
the organisation of elections among Moroccans living abroad’. 
In addition to pressing within European democracy for change in Morocco, the PJD and JC 
have also increasingly taken a stand in support of representing the Muslims of Europe via 
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numerous Islamic structures. Indeed, these parties are not present as such in Europe but are 
rather to be found enmeshed in the European Islamic landscape in the form of cultural and/or 
religious associations, which have either been created as associative structures ex nihilo or 
integrated into already existing organisations. 
Numerous high-ranking members of the National Federation of French Muslims (Fédération 
Nationale des Musulmans de France, FNMF)
8 are members and supporters of the JDP, 
following the example of Anouar Kbibech, President of the Regional Council of the Muslim 
Faith (CRCM) for Ile-de-France East (Conseil Régional du Culte Musulman-Ile-de-France Est), 
the regional branch of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman, CFCM). The CRCM-Ile-de France East was responsible for the creation of a new 
Muslim movement, the Rally of Muslims in France (Rassemblement des Musulmans de France, 
RMF) that held its first meetings in Paris in June 2006 and brought together around 200 mosque 
and associative leaders. According to the President of the CRCM Ile-de-France East, this 
initiative aspires to be ‘complementary to and not in competition with the French Muslim 
Council’.
9  
Founded more recently than the FNMF, Muslim Participation and Spirituality (Participation et 
spiritualité musulmane, PSM)
10 identifies with the Moroccan Sufist and Islamist Justice and 
Charity movement founded in Morocco by Abdessalam Yassine. This association constitutes 
the JC’s European arm (principally in France, Belgium and Canada). Set up by Moroccan 
students who had come to Europe to study at university in the early 1990s, it has grown 
considerably since the year 2000 and is today one of the most active Islamic associations in 
Europe.  
Conceived as structures to defend the interests of Muslims in Europe, these organisations 
propose an Islam which allows one to be a good, engaged Muslim without throwing into 
question integration into European society. The Islam advocated by these structures does not 
claim to break from European social and political values and, according to leaders of these 
associations, the Muslim religion itself constitutes a means for self-affirmation within European 
society. These movements make a point of publicly advocating respect for European political 
standards around such values as citizenship and seek to promote an Islam that takes into account 
Western social realities. In this respect, they are attempting to establish an ‘Islamic citizenship’ 
and present themselves as the privileged interlocutors of local and national public figures in 
relation to such diverse questions as religious activities, racism and the problem of juvenile 
delinquency in the banlieus. While the first generations of Muslim immigrants were not 
attracted by this form of Islamic militancy and preferred to organise themselves around projects 
related to the construction and management of mosques, a proportion of their children, most of 
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whom were born and educated in Europe, are finding a means of fully realising themselves as 
practising and engaged Muslims in this ideology, without repudiating successful economic and 
social integration. The PSM has thus actively mobilised in France against the legal project to 
forbid wearing religious symbols at school by participating in the ‘a school for all’ collective. 
This permitted the emergence of an original coalition of Muslim and secular associations. 
As a third strand to policy, Moroccan Islamists have sought dialogue with political and 
academic bodies within Europe. In this way, they can present their often little-known 
programmes outside their country, while within Morocco appear as central political actors with 
access to networks and international support. A trip to Spain to meet several political leaders 
between 26 March and 1 April 2005 was among the PJD’s recent initiatives. Five members of 
the party’s General Secretariat, including secretary general Saaddine Othmani, were received by 
the vice-president of Spain’s Socialist Party and the Popular Party. This delegation also met 
with the President of the Spanish Parliament, representatives of the Association of Moroccan 
Workers and Immigrants in Spain (AMWIS), the President of the Spanish Employers’ Union, 
José Maria Cuevas, and the President of the Spanish Confederation of Business Organisations.  
This visit was part of a programme established by the General Secretariat of the party to visit 
several European capitals in the run up to the 2007 legislative elections in Morocco. As part of 
this programme, on 6-12 April the PJD delegation also visited Paris where it met with several 
representatives of France’s main political parties. Among them were a representative of the right 
wing Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP), François 
Bayrou; the President of the centre Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie 
Française, UDF), Jean-Pierre Chevènement; and Gérard Chenel, the Socialist Party’s (Parti 
Socialiste, PS) representative in charge of Mediterranean affairs. Here, too, the delegation’s 
meetings with political parties were accompanied by a strategy targeting Muslim communities 
in France.
11 
While the PJD’s external relations efforts target European institutional and political groups, the 
non-legalised JC is forced to focus on alternative political networks and intellectual forums. 
Nadia Yassine participates in a series of forums and meetings organised by such anti-
globalisation movements as the IV European Social Front held in Athens from on 4-7 May 
2006, and the first congress of Islamic feminism held in Barcelona on 27-29 October 2005. 
Positioning oneself as a ‘thinker’ or ‘university academic’ is a means by which figures without 
official recognition can make their voices heard by their respective states and thus by EU 
member states. Nadia Yassine also often participates in university conferences where she is 
invited to express her views as an intellectual on the state of Islamic political thought today, as 
she did in May 2003 during the VI International Congress of the Mediterranean Studies 
Association in Budapest, in June 2004 at San Sebastian and again the same year in Amsterdam 
on the initiative of the ‘Al Bayt al arabi’ institution.  
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighbourhood Policy 
While Moroccan Islamists claim to support democratic rule and show an admiration for Europe 
in this regard, there is a desire to distinguish between being pro-democracy and being pro-
Western. Both the PJD and JC maintain that there is no necessary relation between the two. The 
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Islamists regularly denounce Western cultural and political imperialism towards their country, 
claiming that democratisation is only a pretext for Europe and the United States to Westernise 
(and thus de-Islamicise) Moroccan society. They assert that Moroccan society itself possesses 
the cultural resources necessary to become a democratic society and that these are to be drawn 
from Islamic sources. This is why Moroccan Islamists also desire to distance themselves from 
Western influence and schools of thought (the philosophy of the Enlightenment, for example). 
The same refusal to borrow Western political culture is extended to minority rights (where 
minority rights are said to have a non-Western, Islamic origin). During a 2004 conference in 
Paris organised by a French Muslim association, Nadia Yassine argued that the Prophet himself 
protected religious minorities and that, in consequence, ‘it is useless to turn to Western political 
culture in this area’. 
Apart from a complete refusal to borrow Western models, Moroccan Islamists denounce what 
they see as the selective and opportunistic manner in which Europe applies democratic 
principles. Europe does not require that its authoritarian allies practise democracy. Moreover, 
they believe that Europe opposes elections when Islamists are brought to power. As a PJD 
leader who lives in France stated, ‘On the one hand, Europe suspects us of having an ambivalent 
relationship with democracy but when we win in elections, they oppose our victory as happened 
with Hamas in Palestine. In such a context, how are we supposed to value democracy and desire 
that the democratic process develops in the Arab world?’
12 However, these anti-Western 
criticisms do not at all represent a desire to break with Europe; on the contrary. In the mind of 
the Islamists, collaborating with the West is a political necessity: their aim is to appear as 
respectable agents of change. 
Crucially, PJD and JC views on the European foreign policy initiatives in Morocco are not 
strongly favourable. Despite the importance of EU aid to Morocco, European policies have yet 
to conceive of a place for the Islamists in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Also, 
they have not considered their possible integration in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The failure to integrate Moroccan Islamists into the ENP and 
EMP contrasts with the American policy of establishing relations with these political actors. 
Since the 11 September attacks, the US regards Moroccan Islamists as reliable partners capable 
of playing a driving role in the democratisation process and as a bulwark against Islamic 
terrorism. Europe, by contrast, has always been reluctant to include North African Islamists in 
their partnership and neighbourhood policies, which are very strongly marked by security 
preoccupations. In a context of Islamic terrorism, EU relations with southern countries have 
been driven by a concern to preserve political stability. This has led Europe to support Arab 
regimes threatened by the rise of Islamic terrorism, even when those regimes are authoritarian.
13 
Very strongly influenced by the spectre of Algerian Islamism, it is judged that the European 
Union has always refused to accept North African Islamists as reliable partners in dialogue, 
judging that these groups advocate the creation of an Islamic state opposed to democratic 
principles. The EU’s position regarding Moroccan Islamists finds its justification in the analysis 
of experts (scholars and consultants) who hold that a declining Islamism
14 can no longer 
constitute an actor in the EMP, for it no longer represents a portion of the country’s public 
opinion. This security-based perspective also prevents the EU from considering these parties as 
political partners and has thereby led it to exclude all civil society NGOs with an Islamic 
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identity from the structures of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The result has been an over-
representation of secular and pro-government associations as well as relative indifference on the 
part of the Islamists towards the EMP. 
Moroccan Islamists regret the absence of supportive EU policies and denounce Europe’s 
slowness in addressing the Islamist phenomenon. ‘The Europeans still see Islamism as a 
phenomenon synonymous with instability and conflict’, one PJD member lamented. ‘Yet 
Islamism is plural and part of the Islamist trend has changed and evolved. This latter has long 
accepted Western political values and the need for dialogue with Europe’.
15 Given the important 
place it occupies on the Moroccan political scene, the Islamists say that they would willingly 
respond to any overture on the part of the European Union. They complain of the lack of 
initiative on the part of the EU. ‘Europe has still not understood that, whatever it says or does, 
we represent a majority of Moroccans and, by consequence, Morocco’,
16 bemoans one Justice 
and Charity militant. ‘If Europe wishes to engage in dialogue with Morocco and encourage 
political pluralism here, it has to speak with us rather than denounce us as dangerous terrorists. 
We are better positioned than anyone else in Morocco to encourage the emergence of a genuine 
democracy’.
17 
Given the expressed desire of the PJD and JC to establish relations with the EU, they deplore 
the lack of policies seeking dialogue with Islamic parties within the European Union.
18 
Moroccan Islamists, for their part, have been particularly critical vis-à-vis the policies pursued 
within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, condemning what they see as 
Europe’s desire to impose its own values through cooperation programmes, especially 
concerning women’s rights.
19 Another criticism made by the Islamists of European policy is that 
instead of attempting to give lessons to Muslim civil societies, Europe should address respect 
and defence of the rights of Muslim Europeans. 
Some links exist on an ad hoc basis with projects run by a number of individual EU member 
states. However, the nature of these links is often determined by the countries that participate in 
them. The resulting initiatives are thus those of individual member states rather than of the 
European Union as a whole. Instead of being coordinated, there is a divergence between the 
policies of the various EU member states. Although they have received very little media 
attention, initiatives such as the convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC)
20 on the fight against international terrorism signed at Ouagadougou on 1 July 1999, as 
well as the exchanges that have taken place since then between the OIC and the EU, are 
examples of how the Islamic factor has found some place in discussions between the EU and its 
neighbours. 
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Despite several attempts at rapprochement and the growing interest shown by the European 
Union in the question of political Islam, these initiatives remain informal and do not take place 
within an institutionalised structure. Within the foreign ministries of certain member states such 
the UK and Spain, however, there exist discussion and reflection groups devoted to Islamic 
parties. These initiatives have yet to be translated into concrete measures within EU institutions, 
however, as evidenced during the November 2005 ‘Barcelona +10’ summit, the absence of new 
tools and actors for tackling political questions (particularly that of democratisation) with 
southern states has led to a pro-regime focus on the fight against terrorism. 
As already stated, in this regard Moroccan Islamists compare the EU unfavourably with the US’ 
policy of deepening engagement. When a part of the Moroccan political class, strongly 
supported by the government’s left wing, called for the PJD to be dissolved in the aftermath of 
the 16 May 2003 attacks in Casablanca, American Ambassador Margaret Tutweiler intervened 
with the support of her administration to prevent this from happening. Moroccan Islamists 
complained of European silence on this issue. American diplomats have come regularly to 
consult the Islamists on Morocco’s political situation.
21 
While the Islamists congratulate American policy towards them and recognise the courage of 
American authorities in this area, they express their regret that the European Union does not 
have a similar policy. As a result, the EU has an image problem within Islamist parties while the 
US is increasingly seen in a positive light, despite criticism of its Arab policy. As a JC militant 
explained, ‘The US has scored points in this area and caught up with Europe. If the US didn’t 
support Israel and wasn’t at war in Iraq, American policy towards Muslim countries would be 
excellent’.
22 
The US has also forged relations with the clandestine JC organisation. American officials thus 
recently defended Nadia Yassine when Moroccan authorities sought to punish her for her 
violent remarks against the monarchy. She has also been invited to speak at conferences held by 
a number of American universities, such as the University of California, Berkeley and Harvard 
University, among others. 
Conclusion 
The EU’s support for the Moroccan regime and eschewal of significant engagement with 
Moroccan Islamists ensures that the PJD and JC remain critical of the ENP and EMP. 
Soberingly, these groups complain that the EU has fallen well behind the US in terms of 
engagement with Morocco’s Islamists. Significantly, the PJD and JC have become more active 
within European democracies than the EU has in recognising them as democratic actors within 
Morocco. This imbalance is especially marked in the case of the JC movement.  
The integration of Islamists who represent a non-negotiable part of public opinion and enjoy 
popular support would allow the EMP to have a better impact on the ground. This would help 
the EU and its various cooperation programmes to increasingly reduce anti-European sentiment 
over questions of democratisation and to catch up with the US in this area. By including them in 
these European dynamics, the Islamists would be in some ways prodded to clarify their still 
ambiguous positions regarding democracy and human rights. Multiplying interlocutors in the 
framework of the ENP and EMP would force the Moroccan regime to take greater account of 
                                                      
21 “Stratégie: Bush drague nos islamistes”, (“Strategy: Bush flirts with our Islamists” - editor’s 
translation) Tel Quel, No. 177, 21 May 2005. 
22 Interview with Jamel T., Paris, 15 June 2006. 10 | SAMIR AMGHAR 
 
EU recommendations concerning democracy and the economy. This policy will only be 
possible if the EU clearly defines its action lines towards the question of Islamist politics in the 
Arab world, while also multiplying its political exchanges, not only with the Islamists, but with 
all Moroccan political actors, particularly those representing civil society. 
Faced with the absence of opportunities for dialogue at the level of the European Union, 
Moroccan Islamists increasingly have a tendency to turn towards the US, which has in the past 
five years observed a policy of consulting Islamist parties. But the EU can nevertheless make a 
profound difference and play a distinctive role. The privileged position that it occupies among 
leaders of southern states, as well as the tools that are at its disposal for engaging civil societies 
in the EMP, might facilitate the establishment of a triangular diplomacy between the EU, state 
leaders and Islamist parties. This would give new momentum to the theme of democratisation, 
today entirely subjugated by security preoccupations. 
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